Q&A: Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan Explained by International Law Expert
By: Pedro Naveiras
In January, President Trump formally unveiled his Middle East Peace Plan during a press conference alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Palestinian representatives were not invited, having pre-emptively rejected the proposal, citing flagrant bias in the drafting of the peace agreement. In short, the plan calls for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, a four year moratorium on the construction of Israeli settlements, for Jerusalem to be the undivided capital of Israel, and for Israel to annex all settlements as well as the Jordan Valley. Opponents of a two-state solution celebrated the deal as the definitive end of the possibility for an independent Palestinian state, while supporters condemned the plan, calling it the final nail in the coffin of the two-state solution.
Professor David Sloss teaches Constitutional and International Law at the SCU School of Law. He is an internationally renowned scholar who focuses on the relationship between domestic law and international affairs.
Images are from White House Peace to Prosperity Plan website.
Question: What are the most important things to know about the plan?
Answer: My impression is that the plan is designed primarily to boost reelection chances for both Trump and Netanyahu. This is not a serious proposal to solve problems in the Middle East. It is essentially asking the Palestinians to give up everything that is important to them and giving Israelis everything they want. That’s not a good formula for solving a problem; basically saying one side capitulates, and the other side gets what it wants.
Are there any aspects of the plan you see as positive?
In defense of the U.S. government, all they are doing is putting a proposal on the table. The U.S. government is not going to the Palestinians and saying you must accept this. They are saying here’s a proposal, use this as a basis for discussion.
Have you seen any repercussions since the announcement of the plan, either in the U.S. or abroad?
The Gulf States have been pretty muted in their criticisms and in fact have made some noises that they are willing to go along with this. And part of that is for exactly what you say. There is a common enemy of Iran, they see that their interests align with Israel and the United States fighting against Iran, so that makes them more willing to go along. But officially, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have denounced it. The Palestinians have basically said this is dead on arrival.
One thing I thought you might have been asking about, I don’t think, at least so far, that there’s been any violent protests in response to this. So, you might have anticipated that, but we haven’t seen that, at least so far.
But, the broader implication is that this is killing the two-state solution. For the last 70 years or so, the governing assumption has been the ultimate solution to this problem is there has to be a two-state solution — a viable Palestinian state and a viable Israeli state. And this agreement makes a Palestinian state almost impossible.
You mentioned that the proposed plan might essentially be a nonstarter. Do you see any issues with the fact that the Palestinians were not part of the negotiations?
Yes, that’s a huge issue. If you want to really solve the problem you have to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians together. Get them talking to each other and get them trying to come up with a solution. For an outside party to basically say here’s the solution and we’re laying it down and essentially consulting with only one side, but not the other side, it’s not a serious effort. Anyone who has ever done any international negotiation will tell you that is a recipe for failure.
How do you think this plan compares with previous administrations’ attempts at making a peace deal?
This goes back to Kissinger, at least. The assumption of every administration, since Nixon or Ford, has been the U.S. role is to be a neutral mediator in which we help the Israelis and the Palestinians to work out an agreement between themselves. Every [prior] administration has stuck with the idea that the way we can be most helpful is if we are a neutral mediator who has the trust of both sides. Trump has basically ditched that idea. He has not and does not pretend to be a neutral mediator and neither does the administration. Clearly, the U.S has come down on the side of the Israelis, specifically the hardline faction within the Israeli government, which has been the governing group in Israel for years.
One other thing, I think the likely consequence, in the short term, is we’re going to see some escalation of violence in Gaza, in the West Bank. And we’re going to see Israelis getting killed as a result of that because you make the Palestinians sufficiently desperate and they have no choice but to resort to violence. And I think that’s where this is headed.
What do you think is going to happen next?
I think that if a Democratic president is elected in November they are going to scrap this deal. If Trump is reelected, that puts more pressure on the Palestinians to at least think about coming to the table and trying to negotiate off of this. Use this as a jumping off point for negotiations. I don’t think the Palestinians at this point have any incentive to deal with this proposal from the Trump administration as a serious proposal. But at this point, the Palestinians don’t seem to want to negotiate and that’s probably fine at least until we get to the next election and see what happens.
(Editor's Note: This article was originally published in the March 2020 [Volume 50, Issue 3] version of The Advocate.)